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"The harshness and injustice of the
common law rule... has frequently been
commented on": Debating Contributory
Negligence in Canada, 1914-1949

In the early twentieth century many legal professionals damned the law of
contributory negligence as complicated and unfair to plaintiffs barred from
recovery, while business people often complained that judges and juries refused to
find sympathetic plaintiffs contributorily negligent. Elite Canadian lawyers, through
their work in the Canadian Bar Association and the Commission on Uniformity of
Legislation in Canada, proposed model contributory negligence legislation that
a number of provinces subsequently adopted. Reviews of these statutes were
mixed however The large body of existing case law, despite its complications,
encouraged some lawyers and judges to fall back on older jurisprudence in
interpreting the new acts. Legislators and law reformers responded by increasing
the length and complexity of the negligence statutes, thus undermining the goal
of simplifying the law
Au ddbut du vingtidme sidcle, les sp~cialistes du droit ont 6t6 nombreux &
condamner la rdgle relative j la negligence de la victime comme 6tant compliqude
et injuste pour les demandeurs priv6s d'un recours alors que les gens d'aftaires
se plaignaient souvent du fait que juges et jurys refusaient de d~clarer que des
demandeurs sympathiques 6taient eux-m~mes responsables de n6gligence.
Des avocats canadiens de renom, dans leurs travaux au sein de 'Associationdu
Barreau canadien et de la Conf6rence sur I'uniformisation des lois au Canada,
ont propos6 un moddle de loi en cette matibre qui a par la suite et6 adopte par
bon nombre de provinces. Les opinions sur ces lois 6taient toutefois partagees.
La jurisprudence considdrable, malgr6 ses complications, a encourag6 certains
avocats et certains juges 6 sappuyer sur des prdc~dents anciens pour interprdter
les nouvelles lois. Les Idgislateurset les rdformateurs du droit ont alors rdagi en
allongeant les lois sur la negligence et en les rendant plus complexes, ce qui a
mind I'objectif qui 4tait de simplifier le droit.
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Introduction
This article explores the debates over, and the legislation concerning, the
tort law doctrine of contributory negligence in Canada from the Great War
to the abolition of new appeals from Canada to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in 1949. Canadian legal historians have given scant
attention to tort law for the period after 1915. The lack of interest in tort
law is both understandable and lamentable. The focus on the period before
1915 stems in part from the tendency of Canadian scholars to follow
American academic trends in this area. Morton Horwitz's 1977 work The
TransformationofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 proved especially influential.
He argued that American judges reshaped the common law in the nineteenth
century to encourage capitalist development. Using an "instrumentalist"
approach, the judiciary deviated from American and British precedents in
several areas of the law, including tort, to ensure that a disproportionate
share of the wealth produced by the industrial economy remained with the
upper echelons of American society. "During the eighty years after the
American Revolution," Horwitz concluded, "a major transformation of
the legal system took place." The result was that "emergent entrepreneurial
and commercial groups" won "a disproportionate share of wealth and
power in American society."'
Horwitz's thesis spurred imitators and critics. Critics included Gary
T. Schwartz and Peter Karsten. Schwartz counters the argument that
American courts assisted business interests in tort cases, suggesting that
"the nineteenth-century negligence system was applied with impressive

1. Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977) at xvi.
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sternness to major industries" and that "tort law exhibited a keen concern
for victim welfare."2 Karsten similarly suggests that the judiciary did not
contort decisions to support the propertied and powerful.'
Legal historians investigating developments in Canadian tort law have
taken sides in this debate. James Muir concludes that the law of injuries
in mid-nineteenth-century Nova Scotia suggests that the province's judges
"demonstrated a willingness to think instrumentally about the law and in
favour of private industrial interests."' In his study of occupational health
and safety regulation in Ontario from 1850 to the creation of a provincial
workers' compensation board in 1914, Eric Tucker argues that in the
late nineteenth century "the common law embraced a system of market
regulation of occupational health and safety."' On the other hand, Jennifer
Nedelsky diverges from the Horwitzian thesis in examining Canadian
nuisance law between 1880 and 1930. She concludes that nuisance
cases "show that the Canadian courts were considerably less willing to
abridge the common law rights of occupiers in response to the pressures
of industrialization than their American counterparts or their English
mentors," and that courts proved "generally unwilling to deny traditional
remedies in order to foster development or minimize its costs."' Peter
Karsten uses his examination of almost 600 appellate level negligence
decisions handed down in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to reveal
"a proplaintiff bias" among many jurists, despite the existence of common
law defences, including contributory negligence.' The work of Karsten
and Nedelsky thus suggests, in opposition to the work of Muir and Tucker,
that the law treated parties fairly.

2.
Gary T Schwartz, "Tort Law andthe Economy inNineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A Reinterpretation"
(1981) 90 Yale LJ 1720. See also Gary T Schwartz, "The Character of Early American Tort Law"
(1989) 36 UCLA L Rev 641.
Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel
3.
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) at 79-127.
James Muir, "Instrumentalism and the Law of Injuries in Nineteenth-Century Nova Scotia" in
4.
Philip Girard, Jim Phillips & Barry Cahill, eds, The Supreme Court ofNova Scotia, 1754-2004: From
Imperial Bastion to ProvincialOracle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society
for Legal History, 2004) 361 at 364.
5.
Eric Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational
Health and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
6.
Jennifer Nedelsky, "Judicial Conservatism in an Age of Innovation: Comparative Perspectives
on Canadian Nuisance Law, 1880-1930" in David H Flaherty, ed, Essays in the History of Canadian
Law, Volume I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society for Legal History,
1981) 281 at 286, 287.
7.
Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: "High" and "Low" Legal Cultures in the Lands ofthe
British Diaspora-The United States, Canada,Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 450.

140 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The development of contributory negligence law in Canada fails to
fit neatly within either polarized academic position. Legal scholars and
the judiciary damned the law of contributory negligence as complicated,
confused, and unfair to plaintiffs barred from recovery. A desire to assist
plaintiffs thus motivated some advocates of reforming contributory
negligence. Business, however, also supported altering the doctrine.
In the early twentieth century, courts often found against corporations
(especially railroads and streetcar companies) in negligence cases, despite
businesses raising the defense of contributory negligence. The business
community thus proved willing to accept, and even advocate for, a
statutory change that, on its face, appeared to benefit injured plaintiffs.
When business interests looked for an instrument to amend the law,
they found a willing partner: the elite Canadian corporate lawyer. By
the early twentieth century, the leadership of the bar increasingly came
from the ranks of corporate lawyers, many of whom became dependent
on pleasing a handful of powerful and wealthy clients. Corporate lawyers
filled the ranks of the Canadian Bar Association (formed in 1914) and the
Commission on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (formed in 1918).
These national bodies preached the value of law reform to assist business,
proposing reforms for provincial governments to adopt, including a model
contributory negligence bill. The act, when and where it was adopted,
helped businesses avoid full liability for accidents. In the interwar period,
therefore, elite lawyers (not just the judiciary as Horwitz and Muir, among
others, emphasize) became vital to the instrumental reshaping of the law.
In demonstrating these claims, this article first considers the state
of contributory negligence before the Great War. It then takes stock of
the critiques of the contributory negligence doctrine, including that it
was unjust, uncertain, and hampered business. The article's next section
details the efforts to have provinces pass legislation to alter the common
law rule. The judicial interpretation of these acts is analyzed prior to a final
discussion of subsequent proposals and legislative reforms up to 1949.
I. Contributory negligence before the Great War
Nineteenth-century courts developed the basic doctrines concerning
negligence law. Failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming
another person gave the injured party a right to sue for damages. Courts
also developed guidelines to ensure that a reasonably close connection
between the act and the injury existed-that is, there had to be "proximate
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cause" to "avoid a limitless chain of liability."' Contributory negligence
constituted another potential bar to recovery-in fact, it offered an absolute
defence if successfully invoked. Several nineteenth-century English cases
became key signposts for the contributory negligence doctrine. Latenineteenth- and early-twentieth-century courts pointed to the 1809 case of
Butterfield v Forresteras announcing the rule of contributory negligence
in English law.' As railway law expert Angus MacMurchy summarized in
the CanadianBar Review in 1923, negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
"however slight, as amounts to want of ordinary care and prudence" would
prevent recovery "if such negligence contributes directly to produce
the injury.""o The time sequence of accidents emerged as important in
contributory negligence cases. By the 1840s a consensus had emerged that
if both parties had been concurrently negligent, the plaintiff's negligence
prevented him or her from receiving compensation. However, when the
defendant's negligence followed the plaintiff's, courts sometimes allowed
recovery, as demonstrated in the famous case of Davies v Mann." In this
case, the plaintiff tethered a donkey in the road and the defendant ran into
it. Despite the plaintiff's negligence, the court held the defendant liable
because of what became known as the "last clear chance" doctrine. That
is, the defendant was liable because he had the last opportunity to avoid
the accident-he was, as other judges concluded, "ultimately" negligent or
"directly" responsible. The last clear chance doctrine could work against
plaintiffs however. If the plaintiff could have avoided the consequence of
the defendant's negligence, s/he failed to recover.12
Critics who believed that contributory negligence barred recovery
unfairly damned the rule as one of the "unholy trinity" of defences that
also included voluntary assumption of risk (barring recovery to plaintiffs
who knowingly placed themselves in danger) and the fellow servant rule
(preventing employees from suing employers for injuries caused by fellow
employees). The 1867 case of Plantv The GrandTrunk Railway Company
provides a classic illustration of the challenges the rule could impose on

8.
Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender Race, Law, and the Railroad
Revolution, 1865-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 82.
9.
Butterfield v Forrester(1809), 103 ER 926 (KB); Harry Abbott, A Treatiseon the Railway Law
of Canada (Montreal: C Theoret, 1896) at 368.
10. Angus MacMurchy, "Contributory Negligence-Should the Rule in Admiralty and the Civil
Law be Adopted?" (1923) 1 Can Bar Rev 844 at 852; Angus MacMurchy & John D Spence, The
CanadianRailway Act, 1919, 3d ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1922).
11. Davies v Mann (1842), 152 ER 588 (Exch).
12. WR Cornish & G de N Clark, Law and Society in England, 1750-1950 (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1989) at 494-496; Wex S Malone, "The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence" (1946)
41 Illinois L Rev 151.
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working people. William Plant, a Grand Trunk employee, was helping
clear away snow on a railway track near Georgetown, Ontario. When a
freight car approached, the foreman ordered the employees to clear the
line. However, Plant "lost his presence of mind" and ran along the track in
front of the train. The train's crew acted negligently in tending the brakes,
such that the train overtook Plant, killing him. His widow sued the railway
and won at trial. The railway appealed and the appellate court allowed the
appeal, dismissing the widow's suit. Chief Justice William Draper invoked
the employee's voluntary assumption of risk and declared that the court
could "scarcely imagine a clearer case of contributory negligence." While
the "loss and misfortune to the plaintiff and her children is doubtless very
serious and sad," the court "must not be drawn out of our path of duty,
even by our feelings for the widow and orphans."" As Draper noted, the
contributory negligence doctrine "forced" courts to pay no heed to the
suffering of the plaintiff and his family.
Reported cases, however, suggest that contributory negligence did
not always shield businesses, especially when average people sought
compensation when struck by railways or streetcars. Railways and
streetcars killed or injured many Canadians in the early twentieth century,
with the result that injured parties (or the relatives of deceased men and
women) often sued in negligence. As the Canada Law Journal thus
noted in 1911, the "subject of negligence" is "prominent in these days of
rapid transit and reckless disregard of life." 4 Often, accidents occurred
when trains failed to warn of their approach at crossings by using lights,
bells, and whistles. Trams ran down many men and women who crossed
streets without first checking for traffic. Passengers also suffered injuries
in "alighting" incidents-that is, when they boarded or exited moving
trains or trams. While contributory negligence prevented many injured
parties from receiving compensation, in many other instances plaintiffs
succeeded. According to Karsten, English law required that plaintiffs use
"due care" in crossings, but "this was a highly subjective standard," such
that "some jurists (and few jurors)" expected "much of pedestrians and
wagon drivers," while "other jurists (and most jurors)" expected "much
less," and thus refused to non-suit plaintiffs.
13. Plant v The Grand Trunk Railway Company (1867), 27 UCQB 78 at 86.
14. "Humanity and the Law" (1911) 47 Can U 719 at 719. The frequency of accidents led to plenty
of legal commentary on the issue of railway and streetcar accidents. For examples, see WE Raney,
"The Pedestrian and the Street Car" (1914) 50 Can U 121-139; "Duty of Traveller on Highway when
Approaching Railroad Crossings" (1914) 50 Can U 407-412. On the negligence litigation caused
by the development of railways in England see RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism,
1825-1875 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) at 254-321.
15. Karsten, supranote 7 at 405.
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Various exaniples illustrate the willingness of some courts to refuse
to find against plaintiffs in cases involving railroads and streetcars, even
when plaintiffs had clearly contributed to the accident. For example, in
Halifax Electric Tramway Co v Inglis, a cab driver attempted to cross the
track of an electric tram without watching out for the streetcar. The tram
operator tried to stop with his brakes and then reversed power. In finding
for the plaintiff, the jury found that the tram driver was going too fast on a
downgrade and should have been keeping a better lookout. The Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia upheld the trial decision, as did the Supreme Court
of Canada on the ground that the tram operator had the last chance to
avoid the accident. 16 In McKay v Grand Trunk Railway Company, a train
struck the plaintiff at a busy crossing in Sarnia not protected by a gate or
watchman. The jury found for the plaintiff, determining that the train was
moving too fast without sufficient protection at the crossing. At the Ontario
Court ofAppeal, Justice James Thompson Garrow asserted that "there was
evidence, I am inclined to think strong evidence, of contributory negligence
on the plaintiff's part," but he refused to interfere." In British Columbia
Electric Railway v Dumphy, a passenger in an automobile warned the
inattentive driver of an approaching streetcar. The jury found for the
plaintiff on the ground that the streetcar driver had been insufficiently
cautious in approaching the crossing. The Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed the trial judgment on the ground that the driver had not been
contributorily negligent." In Long v Toronto Railway Co, the Supreme
Court of Canada held a railway liable after a pedestrian crossed the road
with his head down, oblivious to his surroundings. The Court concluded
that the electric tram's driver should have realized that the pedestrian might
attempt to cross the tracks, and believed that the motorman had the last
chance to avoid the accident. ' In Keith v Ottawa and New York Railway,
a passenger got off a train in motion when the train began to leave the
station without stopping a sufficient amount of time. The passenger fell
and suffered an injury. The jury did not hold the passenger contributorily

16. Halifax Electric Tramway Co v Inglis (1900) 36 Can U 303; Halifax Electric Tramway Co v
Inglis (1899), 32 NSR 117; Halifax Electric Tramway Co v Inglis (1900), 30 SCR 256.
17. McKay v Grand Trunk RW Co (1903), 5 OLR 313; McKay v Grant Trunk Rw Co (1903) 39 Can
LJ 247.
18. British Columbia Electric Railway Co v Dunphy (1919), 59 SCR 263; BC Electric Rly Co v
Dunphy (1919) 39 Can LT 716.
19. Long v Toronto Railway Co (1914), 50 SCR 224.

144 The Dalhousie Law Journal
negligent, and the appeal courts agreed.20 While other examples exist of
plaintiffs unsuccessfully suing railroads and streetcar companies because
of findings of contributory negligence, the cases mentioned illustrate that
the law did not preclude successful negligence lawsuits against business.
II. The critique of contributorynegligence
Despite the willingness of some courts to find for plaintiffs in accidents
involving streetcars and railways even when evidence existed of
contributory negligence, the perceived harshness of the doctrine
contributed to efforts to create workers' compensation schemes in the
early twentieth century. Common law defences, including contributory
negligence, proved especially effective when employers sought to protect
themselves from claims stemming from workplace injuries or deaths. As
a result, the public called for action. The Manitoba Free Press claimed
in 1909 that contributory negligence "always operated unjustly toward
the workingman" and was the "most one-sided law that had ever been
enacted."2' In 1914, Ontario created a workers' compensation board. The
legislature eliminated contributory negligence on the part of a worker as
a bar to recovery of damages and dictated that damages be awarded in
proportion to the degree to which the employer and employee were at
fault.2 2 Lawyer George Kingston celebrated the workers' compensation
legislation in the CanadianLaw Times, damning contributory negligence
(along with the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk doctrine) as
operating "to relieve the employer from all liability in a very large number
of cases," such that "their manifest unfairness" had begun to "impress
itself on the minds of right thinking people." 23
Leading Canadian lawyers began to criticize the contributory
negligence doctrine in situations other than workplace accidents. At times,
20. Keith v Ottawa andNew York RW(1903) 39 Can LJ 200; Keith v Ottawa andNew York Railway
Co (1902), 5 OLR 116. Also see Bell v Winnipeg Street Ry Co (1905) 41 Can LJ 617; Bell v Winnipeg
Electric Street Ry Co (1905) 15 Man R 338; Sims v Grand Jury Trunk Ry Co (1905) 41 Can LJ 755;
Sims v Grand Trunk RW Co (1905), 10 OLR 330; Preston v Toronto Ry Co (1906) 42 Can U 38;
Preston v Toronto RW Co (1905), 11 OLR 56; Wallman v Canadian Pacific Ry Co (1906) 42 Can LJ
519; Wallman v CanadianPacificRW Co (1906), 16 Man LR 82; Wright v Grand Trunk RW Co (1906)
42 Can LJ 511; Wright v Grand Trunk RW Co (1906), 12 OLR 114. For examples of cases in which
contributory negligence prevented plaintiffs from receiving compensation in accidents involving
railways and streetcars, see O Hearn v Town of Port Arthur (1902) 38 Can LJ 465; O'Hearn v Town
ofPort Arthur (1902), 4 OLR 209; London Street Railway Co v Brown (1902) 38 Can LJ 153; London
Street Railway Co v Brown (1901), 31 SCR 642.
21. "Contributory Negligence," Manitoba Free Press (2 March 1909) 1. A delegation asking for
law reforms that would benefit workers in Manitoba in 1917 included an appeal to eliminate the
contributory negligence rule: "Want Workers' Legislation," ManitobaFreePress (17 January 1917) 5.
22. Ontario Workmen CompensationAct, SO 1914, c 25.
23. George A Kingston, "The Workmens Compensation Act, 1914" (1915) 35 Can LT at 302. See
also WGC Howland, "Workmen's Compensation-Domestic Servant" (1936) 1 UTLJ 387.
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lawyers simply argued that the common law doctrine unfairly barred
plaintiffs from securing compensation for their injuries. In 1915, Alberta
Justice William Walsh in Black v City of Calgary unhappily dismissed an
action after a passenger was hurt boarding a moving streetcar: "The law
as it now stands in actions such as this is most unsatisfactory and unjust."
"No matter how great may have been the negligence of a defendant,"
Walsh J. lamented, "if the plaintiff has by his own negligence contributed
to the accident, he cannot recover except, of course, in cases where
ultimate negligence is brought home to the defendant." 24 M.J. Gorman, an
Ottawa lawyer, complained in the CanadianLaw Times in 1917 that recent
contributory negligence cases failed to meet "the requirements of equity
and justice in all cases." He thus pondered the possibility of getting "rid of
all the refinements of legal ingenuity."25
Gorman also offered another typical argument:-that the law of
contributory negligence was too uncertain and that "there is nothing
worse than ambiguity or uncertainty." 26 In a paper delivered to the annual
meeting of the Ontario Bar Association, lawyer Angus MacMurchy also
condemned contributory negligence's growing complexity, which meant
that "a clear enunciation ofthe principle has been for many years a matter of
considerable difficulty to Judges and its application a matter of perplexity
and doubt to juries."27 This was a powerful critique given the dominant
mode of legal analysis in the early twentieth century. As R.C.B. Risk and
others have shown, most Canadian legal professionals generally held a
formalistic approach to the law. They saw law as an apolitical system that
could, or at least should, offer clear rules applicable to any situation. The
complexity and seeming uncertainty of contributory negligence in practice
made the doctrine an embarrassment. 28
The doctrine also became a target of lawyers seeking to make provincial
statutory provisions more business friendly. In the early twentieth century,
the leadership of the Canadian legal profession came increasingly from the
ranks of elite corporate lawyers. In the past, leading barristers had risen
to the top of the profession, but the rise of corporate Canada allowed for
a relatively small group of solicitors to become wealthy and prominent,

24. Black v Calgary(City) (1915), 24 DLR 55 [Black].
25. MJ Gorman, "Negligence-Contributory, 'Ultimate' and 'Comparative', with a Suggested
Statutory Amendment" (1917) 37 Can LT 23 at 31.
26. MJ Gorman, "Contributory Negligence" (1922) 42 Can LT 425 at 425. See also "Ultimate
Negligence" (1918) 54 Can LJ 274.
27. MacMurchy, supra note 10 at 845.
28. RCB Risk, A History of CanadianLegal Thought: CollectedEssays, ed by G Blaine Baker & Jim
Phillips (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society for Legal History, 2006).
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though in the process some became reliant on the patronage of one or
two large businesses. In appealing for law reform, corporate lawyers often
reflected the interests of their clients.29
Making provincial legislation more uniform became one businessfriendly goal of lawyers. This proved especially pressing in the early
twentieth century, a time of substantial corporate consolidation in Canada.
Large companies sought to operate from east to west. They complained that
the fragmentation of legislation caused by the decentralized interpretation
of the British North America Act propounded by the Supreme Court
of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had resulted in great diversity in
provincial legislation that related to business. There had been in the past
periodic calls by lawyers for more uniformity of legislation, but those calls
had failed to achieve results. The Privy Council's decision in Bonanza
Creek in 1916 sparked new appeals for action. In Bonanza Creek, the Privy
Council held that the provinces had the legislative jurisdiction to create
corporations with the capacity to carry on any kind of operation across
Canada, rather than for businesses that fell just within the boundaries of
the province of incorporation as previously assumed.30
Eugene Lafleur, one of Canada's leading lawyers at the time, became
an early proponent of uniformity. Lafleur taught civil law at McGill while
keeping up an active practice, appearing regularly before the Supreme
Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He
took cases covering the whole spectrum of law but achieved a national
reputation as a constitutional lawyer and as a lawyer engaged in freight
rate litigation. Lafleur made a substantial income-in fact, he refused to
accept the position as Chief Justice of Canada in part because he could
make more money in private practice. When he spoke about law reform,
he emphasized the need for legislative uniformity to assist business. For
example, in 1912 Lafleur told the Canada Club of Ottawa that there was
"no field in which uniformity is so desirable as in commercial law," for it
was "impossible now to limit the activities of commercial partnerships and
corporations to a particular province." He also sought uniformity in dealing
29. Carol Wilton, "Introduction: Beyond the Law-Lawyers and Business in Canada, 1830-1930,"
in Carol Wilton, ed, Essays in the History of CanadianLaw, Volume IV-Beyond the Law: Lawyers
andBusiness in Canada,1830 to 1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society
for Legal History, 1990) at 14-20; Philip Girard, "The Maritime Provinces, 1850-1939: Lawyers and
Legal Institutions" (1996) 23 Man LJ 394; Christopher Moore, The Law Society of Upper Canadaand
Ontario'sLawyers, 1797-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 152-156.
30. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co v The King, [1916] 1 AC 566; Allison Dunham, "A History of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws" (1965) 30 Law & Contemp Probs
233.
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with workplace injuries "no matter where the accident takes place." "From
the employer's point of view," he reasoned, it was "manifestly desirable
that there should be one law governing his relations with his working
men."3'
Law reform that achieved greater provincial uniformity also became
a goal of the Canadian Bar Association, which formed in 1914. James
Aikins served as the association's first president, and, importantly, he
was a vocal advocate of legislative uniformity. Although born in Ontario,
Aikins practised in Winnipeg for most of his career. In 1881, he became
counsel for the Western division of the Canadian Pacific Railway, a role
he retained until 1911. He developed a large and lucrative law practice
and made substantial sums through his investments, especially in real
estate in Winnipeg and elsewhere in Manitoba. He acted as solicitor for
many companies, including the Westbourne and Northwestern Railway
Company, the Northern Electric Light Company, the Great-West Life
Assurance Company, the Imperial Bank of Canada, the Bank of Ottawa,
and the Scottish American Investment Company. He also served as a
director of the Northern Trusts Company, the Canadian Fire Insurance
Company, and the Canadian Indemnity Company. He was a millionaire
by 1910.32
This experience in practice shaped the work Aikins undertook as
president of the Canadian Bar Association (a position he held from 1915
until 1927). In an address to a business organization in late 1914, Aikins
proposed ajoint effort by Canadian lawyers and business leaders to secure
more uniform laws since businessmen demanded that the interference
"causedby divergent, conflicting or inconsistent statutory provisions should
end or at least be mitigated."33 At the first annual meeting of the Canadian
Bar Association, Aikins again emphasized the need to pass uniform laws
in common law Canada on the ground that the "law of a country is the
responsive expression of its social and business life and it must expand
with it, or hamper it."34 Such arguments helped shape the constitution of
31. Eugene Lafleur, "Uniformity of Laws in Canada" in Addresses Delivered before the Canadian
Club ofOttawa, 1912-1913 (Ottawa: Mortimer Press, 1913) 52 at 55, 57; LR MacTavish, "Uniformity
of Legislation in Canada-An Outline" (1947) 25 Can Bar Rev 36 at 41-42; David Ricardo Williams,
Just Lawyers: Seven Portraits(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 1995)
at 18-55.
32. Lee Gibson, "Aikins, Sir James Albert Manning," online: Dictionary of CanadianBiography
<http://www.biographi.ca>; BM Greene, ed, Who's Who in Canada, 1930-31 (Toronto: International
Press, 1932) at 54, 270, 1049.
33. James Aikins, Uniformity in ProvincialLegislation (Winnipeg: Canadian Credit Men's Trust
Association, 1914) at 12 [Aikins, Uniformity].
34. James Aikins, "The Advancement of the Science of Jurisprudence in Canada," Report of the
CanadianBarAssociation, 1915 at 18.
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the association. Article I listed the association's goals, including upholding
the honour of the profession and encouraging cordial intercourse among
members of the bar. Article 1 also urged the association to "advance
the science of jurisprudence, promote the administration of justice and
uniformity of legislation throughout Canada so far as consistent with the
preservation of the basic systems of law in the respective provinces.""
Aikins and Lafleur repeatedly appealed for law reform to assist
business. In his 1916 address to the Canadian Bar Association, Aikins
argued that businessmen who wanted to expand their operations "do not
care to risk the uncertainties of the laws of the different legal jurisdictions,"
for they "desire to know definitely their legal rights and remedies.",
Business could only secure statutory uniformity with "the assistance of the
lawyers of Canada."36 Lafleur made similar arguments in an address to the
Canadian Bar Association in 1916. "Every Province," he complained, "has
an insurance law of its own." While these laws were "not differentiated by
any fundamental principles they abound in minor diversities calculated
to produce conflict and uncertainty." This annoyed business, such as "a
great trans-continental railway," which was "unable to get a uniform cover
on its rolling stock throughout Canada" and instead had to "submit to a
modification of its contract every time it crosses a provincial border line."37
Not surprisingly, the association's desire to assist business through
legislative reform received the support of corporate Canada. Officers
and council members of the Canadian Bar Association met with the
Credit Men's Association, boards of trade, manufacturers, and insurance
managers. These business interests offered financial assistance to the
association's legislative reform efforts, and several publicly stated their
support, including the Credit Men's Association and the Federation of the
Chambers of Commerce of the Province of Quebec.38
The Canadian Bar Association sought to achieve law reform by
establishing committees that would identify opportunities to achieve
uniformity in several areas of law. The topics selected indicated the
lawyers' emphasis on assisting business. Committees examined company
law, insurance, conditional sales and succession duties, sale of goods,

35. "Constitution," Report of the CanadianBar Association, 1915, art 1.
36. . James Aikins, "Address of the President," Proceedingsofthe CanadianBarAssociation, 1916 at
80-81, 82 [Aikins, "Address"].
37. Eugene Lafleur, "Uniformity of Laws in Canada," Report ofthe CanadianBarAssociation, 1915
at 25.
38. Aikins, Unformity, supra note 33 at 14; Aikins "Address," supra note 36 at 82-84.
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chattel mortgages, insolvency, bulk sales, and the enforcement of extraprovincial judgments.39
The formation of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation in Canada (hereinafter the Conference) in 1918 represented
a further effort by Canada's leading lawyers to achieve reforms for the
benefit of business. The group had an American model to copy, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of State Law, which
reported to the American Bar Association. 40 The Canadian organization
consisted of a large number of leading lawyers, as well as a smattering
of legal academics and government representatives. Aikins became the
first president of the Conference. Other members included lawyers with
corporate law experience. Frank Ford of Ontario had been a partner in
McCarthy, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt. Travers Sweatman's firm acted
as a solicitor for a number of leading corporate clients, and he served as
president of the Winnipeg Board of Trade in the 1920s. James Layton
Ralston of Nova Scotia served as a director of Maritime Life Assurance
and the Starr Manufacturing Company. Isaac Pitblado, a leading Winnipeg
lawyer, represented Manitoba. Pitblado had expertise in freight rates and,
by 1930, served as a director of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, Toronto
General Trusts Corporation, Lake of the Woods Milling Company, and
Mutual Life Assurance Company, among other companies. He delivered
speeches such as "Why the Business Tax Should be Abolished," and, like
many of Winnipeg's wealthy residents, he opposed the Winnipeg General
Strike, serving on the Citizens' Committee of 1000. In 1923, Pitblado
became president of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation, a role he retained until 1930.41
The leadership of the Conference openly stated a desire to assist
business. In his 1920 presidential address, Aikins asserted that "Canada
takes no second place in endeavouring to facilitate trade and business by
uniformity of laws relating to them within the nation."42 In 1923, another
president of the Conference, Mariner G. Teed of Saint John, bluntly
stated that the organization sought to assist business. The lawyers of
Canada, "wishing to co-operate with business men and others interested
39. RW Shannon, "Uniformity of Legislation" (1930) 8 Can Bar Rev 28 at 29-30.
40. Dunham, supra note 30 at 233-249; Walter P Armstrong, A Century of Service: A Centennial
History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (St Paul, MN: West
Publishing, 1991).
41. Greene, supra note 32 at 194, 919, 1186, 1705-1706; Williams, supra note 31 at 124-154; Isaac
Pitblado, Why the Business Tax Should be Abolished (Winnipeg: Winnipeg Branch of the Retail
Merchants' Association of Canada, 1915).
42. James Aikins, "Presidential Address," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity ofLegislation in Canada, 1920 at 15.
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in interprovincial matters," hoped to have provinces adopt uniform
legislation, "particularly relating to business and commercial transactions
in which the people of the several provinces are concerned."43
The usual practice of the Conference was to identify a certain number
of topics suitable for amendment. The Conference then produced a draft
model bill, debated the draft, and undertook additional revisions. When
approved, the Conference recommended the model bill for adoption
by provincial legislatures. By 1930, the Conference produced twelve
model acts, most of which sought to ease the operation of commerce in
a federal nation. Bills dealt with warehousemen's liens, conditional sales,
life insurance, fire insurance, reciprocal enforcement of judgments, bills
of sale, and assignment of book debts." The Conference also tackled
contributory negligence. At first blush, this is surprising. The doctrine
has long been accused of serving business interests, but, as noted earlier,
case law suggests that courts had found ways to provide compensation for
plaintiffs, especially when people suffered injuries caused by railroads and
streetcar companies. In addition, businesses likely chafed at the uncertainty
of the law in this area, which made litigation expensive and uncertain.
For example, Irving Fairty, general counsel for the Toronto Transportation
Commission, consistently proposed altering the law of contributory
negligence because of the confusing nature of the existing law. 45
Abandoning or altering the contributory negligence doctrine
represented a fairly radical change. England did not pass legislation
permitting apportionment of damages in cases of contributory negligence
until 1945, while Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa waited until
after the Second World War. In 1908, the United States enacted the Federal
Employers' Liability Act that abolished the doctrine of contributory
negligence for railroad workers, and by 1941 nine states also adopted a

43. Mariner G Teed, "Presidential Address," Proceedingsof the Annual Meeting of the Conference
of Commissioners on Unformity of Legislation in Canada,1923 at 20.
44. Shannon, supranote 39 at 30.
45. Fairty stated that his desire to see changes in Ontario stemmed from his personal experience,
not because the Toronto Transportation Commission wanted legislative action, see Irving S Fairty
to Attorney General of Ontario (5 May 1926), AO, RG4-32, file 1961: Attorney General Registry
Criminal and Civil Files; Fairty to Attorney General of Ontario (26 January 1927), AO,'RG4-32, file
720: AGO Legislation-1927 Contributory Negligence Act; Fairty to Attorney General of Ontario (25
August 1927), RG4-32, file 679: Toronto Transportation Commission: Re contributory negligence.
This is not to say that all business interests supported a change to the contributory negligence doctrine.
The managing secretary of the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce expressed concern in 1924 that
proposed reforms might lead some people to put themselves deliberately in the way of an accident see,
FP Healey to WF Nickle (24 March 1924), AO, RG4-32, file 688: AGO Legislation-Amendment of
the law as to contributory negligence.
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"comparative negligence" approach, although they remained the minority
position into the 1960s.4 6
Two models proved more influential in Canada. In admiralty law,
the British Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 imposed apportionment of
damages according to the degrees of fault of each vessel involved in an
accident at sea.4 7 Canada adopted the British statute in 1914 (although it
did not apply it to the Great Lakes or the St. Lawrence as far east as the
lower exit of the Lachine Canal and the Victoria Bridge at Montreal).4 8
The civil law doctrine of faute commune used in Quebec served as a
second important model for critics of the contributory negligence rule.
Chief Justice Charles Fitzpatrick summarized thefaute commune doctrine:
"where the party who claims compensation for an injury caused by the
fault of another has been also guilty of fault, which contributed to the
accident, he must share responsibility, and in that case, the damages are
not divided equally as is the rule in the English Admiralty Courts." 49
Critics of the contributory negligence law frequently noted these two
examples in arguing that the apportionment of damages approach could
work in some cases traditionally embroiled in the contributory negligence
doctrine. In 1915, for instance, Walsh J. in Black v City of Calgary
noted that, in Quebec, "the much more equitable principle prevails of
apportioning the damage between the parties.""o Gorman also pointed to
the admiralty and civil law rules in appealing for change in the Canadian
Law Times in 1923."1 Importantly, justices of the Supreme Court of Canada
also made this case. In a blunt address to the Canadian Bar Association,
Justice Francis Anglin (as he then was) critiqued the law of contributory

46. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 (UK), 8 & 9 Geo VI, c 28; Glanville L
Williams, "The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945" (1946) 9 Mod L Rev 105;
ContributoryNegligence Act (NZ), 11 Geo VI, no 3; Michael Spisto & Less Arthur, "Contributory
Negligence: A Comparison between the South African, Australian and New Zealand Legal Systems"
(2000) 19 U Tasm L Rev 311; KO Shatwell, "Contributory Negligence and Apportionment Statutes"
(1948-1950) 1 UWA Annual L Rev 145; Cecil A Wright, "The Law of Torts: 1923-1947" (1948) 26
Can Bar Rev 46 at 70; John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute
Widows, and the Remaking ofAmerican Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) at 67;
Lawrence M Friedman, "The Litigation Revolution" in Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins,
eds, The CambridgeHistory of Law in America, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century and After (1920-)
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 185; G Edward White, Tort Law in America:
An Intellectual History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 165; Kermit L Hall, The Magic
Mirror: Law in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 297.
47. Maritime ConventionsAct, 1911 (UK), 1 & 2 Geo V, c 57.
48. Maritime Conventions Act, 1914, SC 1914, c 13.
49. Nichols Chemical Company of Canadav Lefebvre (1909), 42 SCR 402 at 404.
50. Black, supra note 24 at para 11.
51. Gorman, supra note 26. See also Lester McTaggart, "The Contributory Negligence Act" (1937)
2:2 Sask Bar Rev & L Soc Gaz 39.
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negligence, comparing it unfavourably with the faute commune doctrine
and the rule in admiralty law:
The English law excluding all relief where the plaintiff has been guilty of
contributory negligence, however slight, has always seemed to me much
less equitable than the provision of the civil law that where there isfaute
commune there should be an apportionment of damages according to the
degree of blame attributable to each party. This feature of the civil law
has been adopted by the English Courts of Admiralty.52
Anglin J.'s public critique of a long accepted doctrine empowered
proponents of reform.
Justice Anglin also expressed his reservations about contributory
negligence in Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co. v Earlin 1923.11 The case,
like many others involving contributory negligence in this period, stemmed
from an injury involving a railway. The accident occurred in Edmonton at
a location where six rail lines crossed a busy street. To prevent accidents,
the Board of Railway Commissioners ordered the company to carry out
its switching movements over the crossing between the hours of 1:00 and
2:30 in the afternoon and between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The Board also
ordered the company to keep a watchman on duty to protect the crossing
during switching operations. The railway clearly violated these orders.
The plaintiff, Earl, a stenographer and bookkeeper, suffered his injury at
6:30 p.m. The company also failed to station a watchman at the site. Earl,
who was on a bicycle, saw the train but erred in anticipating which track
it would take. He ran into some mud and became distracted. The train,
with its bell ringing, struck him while shunting. The trial court awarded
Earl $3,850 in damages, a decision the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld.
However, in a four to one decision, the Supreme Court determined that
the railway company was not liable because of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
Three ofthejudges in the majority uttered frustration with the unfairness
of the contributory negligence doctrine. Justice Anglin expressed the most
displeasure. He complained that the case "illustrates the harshness of the
rule by which, where there is common fault contributing to cause injury to
a plaintiff, he is deprived of all redress and the defendant entirely relieved,
although the culpability of the former may be comparatively slight and
that of the latter distinctly gross." In his view, the "doctrine of the civil law
that in such circumstances the damages should be divided in proportion to
52.

Honourable Justice Francis Anglin, "Some Differences between the Law of Quebec and the Law

as Administered in the Other Provinces of Canada" (1923) 1:1 Can Bar Rev 48-49.
53. Grand Trunk PacificRailway Co v Earl, [1923] SCR 397.
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the degree of culpability commends itself to my judgment as much more

equitable."5 4
Justices Lyman Duff and Pierre-Basile Mignault also critiqued the
result and the existing law. Duff J. wrote that the case was "one of those
cases that sometimes cause one to turn a rather wistful eye to jurisdictions
in which where injury results from the combined negligence or misconduct
of the plaintiff and the defendant, the burden of the loss can be equitably
distributed." "But where the English doctrine of contributory negligence
reigns," Duff J. continued, "a tribunal assessing damages in such
circumstances must find the defendant responsible for the whole of the
loss or for none." Justice Duff also complained that the law of contributory
negligence had become too complex for there had "been a tendency of
over-refinement in the application of the law which has led to a good deal
of confusion and uncertainty." The desire to find for the plaintiff could
lead the court only to complicate the law further, with the result that
the court would "be approaching perilously near to frittering away the
substance of the doctrine which it is the duty of the Court to apply.""
Justice Mignault complained, like Duff J., about the complexity of the
existing jurisprudence: "Questions involving the application of the rule of
contributory negligence are of much nicety and considerable difficulty and
it is not easy to frame a satisfactory formula which can be applied in the
almost infinite variety of circumstances where the rule is invoked." He also
preferred the civil law rule: "IfI may say so, the doctrine of the civil law,
in force in the province of Quebec and also adopted in admiralty matters,
is much more equitable." Mignault J., however, noted that the legislature
would have to change the law." The judicial criticism of any common
law doctrine was unusual in this period, a time when Canadian appellate
court judges tended to write with a passionless style, sought only to apply
existing case law and avoided raising policy considerations. In this case,
however, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada voiced a critique of
the traditional tort law doctrine, much like some contemporary American
judges who, according to William E. Nelson, recognized that "classical
doctrine no longer provided easy answers in every case," such that judges
"began to recognize that issues of liability and causation involved policy
choices."" The tone of the judgments in Earl quickly drew attention
and served as another source of ammunition for critics of contributory
54. Ibid at 406.
55. Ibid at 398-399, 400.
56. Ibid at 408.
57. William E Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York, 19201980 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) at 97.
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negligence. The Canadian Bar Review immediately noted the criticisms
of Duff, Anglin, and Mignault JJ., and suggested that legislatures could
"remedy any evil pointed out by the judges in the existing law.""
The legal profession thus led the effort to ameliorate the contributory
negligence doctrine. In comparison, the effort to secure workers'
compensation schemes had garnered substantial public support. Workers
feared becoming destitute if they suffered an injury at work. Contemporary
newspapers, however, provide little evidence that average Canadians
wanted to amend the law of contributory negligence. Statutory change was
thus an effort by lawyers, and reflected the concerns of the small cadre of
elite legal professionals who led the law reform effort. Reform sought to
make the law more business friendly, more easily applicable, and more
consistent. As will be shown in the next section, these proved difficult
goals to attain.
III. Provinciallegislation
The first effort to move away from the rule that contributory negligence was
an absolute bar to recovery occurred in Ontario. In 1923, lawyer H.P. Hill,
a Conservative member of the Ontario provincial assembly, introduced a
private member's bill to alter the contributory negligence doctrine. His bill
provided that the judge in a negligence case would determine the extent to
which each party was at fault and then apportion damages. If the evidence
prevented a determination as to the relative degrees of fault between
plaintiff and defendant, then the court would find the defendant liable for
one-half the damages. 9
Anglin J. wrote the attorney general of Ontario, W.F. Nickle, to express
his support for the principle of the bill, but Hill's proposal also spurred
calls for caution. The Ontario Bar Association debated the measure, and
the association's Committee on Resolutions asked that the government
delay acting until the legal profession could discuss the idea fully. The

58. RWS, "Contributory Negligence-'Unjust Enrichment'-Civil Law Doctrines" (1923) 1
Can Bar Rev 521. See also, Francis King to WF Nickle (21 February 1924), AO, RG4-32, file 688:
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Sir John Salmond, a justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand and author of a treatise on torts
commented on the contributory negligence rule: "No more baffling and elusive problem exists in the
law of Torts." Salmond instead encouraged reform based on Admiralty law (Gorman, supranote 26 at
432). See also John W Salmond to MJ Gorman (28 August 1922) and John W Salmond to MJ Gorman
(21 July 1924), AO, RG4-32, file 688: AGO Legislation-Amendment of the law as to contributory
negligence.
59. "Bills Introduced Would Alter Laws," Globe and Mail (31 January 1923) 9; MacMurchy,
supra note 10 at 844; MJ Gorman to WF Nickle (16 February 1924), AO, RG4-32, file 688: AGO
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Chief Justice of Ontario, William Meredith, (who had earlier expressed
reservations about altering the contributory negligence rule) also suggested
to the attorney general that the bench and bar should consider the proposal
in more detail, and the bill was withdrawn. The attorney general then
obtained the opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada.
With the exception of Justice John Idington, who expressed no opinion, all
supported legislation that would apportion damages. 0
In 1924, Attorney General Nickle introduced a government bill to
amend the contributory negligence doctrine. 6 1 While Nickle privately
called the proposed change a "revolutionary measure in relation to our
jurisprudence," the bill received a tepid reception in the assembly.62
Lawyer W.E. Raney approved the measure, though he called the approach
a "mathematic distribution" and wondered if the results for parties would
improve.63 Liberal leader and lawyer W.E.N. Sinclair said that if anything
could be done to simplify negligence actions, then he would welcome
the bill. He feared, however, that it might induce "a little gambling in
negligence legislation."64 The act provided that the jury, or judge, if the
action was tried without a jury, had to find first the entire amount of
damages to which the plaintiff would have been entitled if there was no
contributory negligence, and then the degree to which each party was at
fault, with the result that the plaintiff could receive only that proportion
of the damages. If the judge or jury could not determine the respective
degree of damages, then liability for one-half of the damages fell on the
defendant.6 1
The Ontario bill generally received a warm reception in the legal
community. The FortnightlyLaw Journaloffered a minority critical view,
suggesting that the government effort to make the law more equitable might
result in further unfairness to particular plaintiffs. 66 Justice Thibaudeau
Rinfret of the Supreme Court of Canada, on the other hand, remarked
that Anglin J.'s "truly remarkable" appeal for reform to the contributory
negligence doctrine was "beginning to be heard," and he hoped that
60. "Sir William Wants New Act Restricted," Edmonton Bulletin (12 January 1913) 5; Arthur A
Macdonald, "Ontario Bar Association" (1923) 1:4 Can Bar Rev 351 at 351-352; MacMurchy, supra
note 10 at 862; Anglin J to RL Brackin (10 March 1923), AO, RG4-32, file 688: AGO LegislationAmendment of the law as to contributory negligence.
61. "Canadian Bar Review" (1924) 2 Can Bar Rev 203 at 206.
62. WF Nickle to MJ Gorman (18 February 1924), AO, RG4-32, file 688: AGO LegislationAmendment of the law as to contributory negligence.
63. Raney, "Iron Ore Industry to be Encouraged," Globe (26 February 1924) 10.
64. Ibid.
65. The ContributoryNegligence Act, SO 1924, c 32.
66. "Apportionment of Contributory Negligence Damages" (1932) 2 Fort LJ 18; "Contributory
Negligence Complicating the Situation" (1934) 3 Fort LJ 242.
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other provinces would soon follow Ontario's example." Judge E.C.
Huyeke, president of the Ontario Judges Association, called the new act
"satisfactory and an improvement on the old system" for it was "certainly
less confusing to the minds of the laity and those of the bench and bar
as well."" The Canadian Bar Review welcomed the legislation, noting
that the "harshness and injustice of the common law rule" had "frequently
been commented upon and a preference for the more equitable rule of the
civil law expressed." The journal did, however, wonder how the courts
would apply the act. In particular, it "might be anticipated that difficulty
would be found in measuring the respective degrees of fault," but, the
journal believed, it "should prove quite as practicable in common law as
in admiralty courts or in jurisdictions where the civil law prevails." 69 The
CanadianBar Review's assessment would prove overly optimistic.
The Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation
in Canada independently considered a contributory negligence act at
the same time that Ontario debated and passed a statute. In 1923, the
Conference first began work on model legislation after the Canadian
Bar Association recommended that the group tackle the subject. The
Conference appointed the Ontario commissioners to prepare a draft bill:
Francis King, John Falconbridge, and John C. Elliott, as well as Winnipeg
corporate lawyer James Aikins. These members brought relevant expertise
and an awareness of the desires of business. Elliott had sat in the Ontario
legislature and would eventually join Prime Minister Mackenzie King's
cabinet. Falconbridge served as Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School, but
both his experience in practice and his academic interests were in business
law. He worked as a partner in the law firm Cassels, Brock, Kelley &
Falconbridge from 1905 to 1917. While practising, he published books on
the law of banking and bills of exchange, mortgages, sale of goods, and
negotiable instruments. Francis King, from Kingston, Ontario, specialized
in admiralty law. He acted as counsel and spokesperson for Canadian ship
owners on the Great Lakes and upper St. Lawrence River and worked
as general counsel for the Dominion Marine Association. He had broad
experience in admiralty questions in Canadian, American, and British
courts and acted as arbitrator in many shipping cases. This was, therefore,
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68. "Judge Criticizes Acts Ontario Parole Board," Toronto Daily Star (21 May 1926) 1.
69. "Noteworthy Changes in Statute Law" (1925) 3 Can Bar Rev 57 at 67, 68.

Debating Contributory Negligence in Canada,
1914-1949

157

a group well-suited to drawing from admiralty law and crafting a bill
amenable to business.70
These commissioners expressed displeasure with the existing law.
King, for instance, openly criticized the contributory negligence rule.
King served as the president of the Ontario Bar Association, and, in a
1923 speech, he complained about the unfairness of the common law rule
and the complex questions asked ofjurors. He also noted the labyrinthine
jurisprudence courts had developed in interpreting contributory negligence.
Like other advocates of reform, he pointed to the civil law of Quebec
and admiralty law as examples that could be drawn from in reforming the
common law by statute. He sought to counter preemptively two potential
criticisms of legislation altering the law of contributory negligence. He
noted that some lawyers might object to "abandoning a good old common
law doctrine which has been the subject of a tremendous amount of study
and labour" and that "the jurisprudence on the subject would have to be
scrapped." Neither argument bothered King: "The first objection is so ultra
conservative in its nature that it is not likely at present to invite popular
acceptance; and the second, on a moment's consideration, becomes an
argument in favour of the change." 7 1 King was thus ready for action.
In 1924, the Conference received the report of the Ontario members,
debated and amended the proposed bill, and then recommended that
provincial legislatures adopt the model statute. 72 The wording of the
Conference's bill differed somewhat from the Ontario legislation but
sought the same ends.73 The short (six-section) model act provided that,
where two or more persons were involved in an incident, the loss assigned
"shall be in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault."
If, "having regard to all the circumstances of the case," it was impossible
to establish different degrees of fault, then damages would be divided
evenly. The costs of an action would be divided in the same proportion
as the liability for the loss or damage. Finally, the model act was to be
70. Proceedings of the Canadian Bar Association, 1923 at 427-428; Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislationin Canada,1923 at 17-18;
Gibson, supra note 32; Greene, supra note 32 at 54, 270, 1049.
71. Francis King, "A Proposal for the Division of Loss in Contributory Negligence Cases," in
Proceedingsof the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation
in Canada, 1924 at 46. In 1923, King introduced a resolution at the Canadian Bar Association calling
for the reform of contributory negligence: see, Francis King to WF Nickle (21 February 1924), AO,
RG4-32, file 688: AGO Legislation-Amendment of the law as to contributory negligence.
72. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Unformity of
Legislation in Canada, 1924 at 11.
73. The committee explained that it preferred to follow closely the broad terms of the Maritime
Conventions Act, since it had "been interpreted without difficulty and applied satisfactorily in
admiralty actions ever since its enactment": ibid at 34.
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"so interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose of making
uniform the law of those provinces which enact it." 7 4
By 1926, three provinces adopted the model bill. British Columbia
and New Brunswick enacted legislation in 1925 based on the Conference's
work. Nova Scotia first passed legislation modeled on the Ontario act in
1925 but repealed it the following year in favour of the model legislation
of the Conference.7 ' The other common law provinces, however, waited,
and chose not to pass such legislation during the 1920s.
IV. Judicial interpretation
Legal scholars soon debated the scope of these acts, while courts did the
same in applying them. A key issue became whether the acts applied in
cases in which courts deemed the defendant (or plaintiff) to have been
"ultimately" negligent-that is, where it was found that the plaintiff or
defendant should be held liable because they had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident.
An advocate of the legislation, M.J. Gorman, had suggested that
legislation would "effect a revolution in our law," but court decisions
quickly limited the potential impact of the statutes.76 In Ontario, this trend
began with cases like Walker v Forbes in 1925." In Walker, a streetcar
stopped to discharge a passenger. The defendant truck driver drove
over the passenger's foot as he moved across a lane of traffic to reach
the sidewalk. At trial, the Court asked the jury the traditional questions
posed in contributory negligence cases designed to determine if there was
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff that barred his recovery.
The jury found each party fifty per cent at fault, so the plaintiff received
half of his damages from the defendant. Justice William Renwick Riddell
agreed that the case was an example of contributory negligence, but noted
that the new statute would "not apply where there is ultimate negligence
found in such a way as that before the statute the plaintiff would succeed.""
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Riddell J. thus suggested the continued existence of ultimate negligence
out of his assumption that the legislature sought to ensure that plaintiffs
could secure full judgments.
The Supreme Court of Canada tackled whether the doctrine of last clear
chance survived the contributory negligence acts in McLaughlin Estate v
Long in 1927, a case that originated in New Brunswick. The ten-year-old
plaintiff rode on the running board of the defendant's bread delivery truck.
The jury held the defendant liable after the plaintiff suffered an injury when
the truck ran off the road, but also found the boy negligent for riding on the
running board despite being asked by the defendant to get off. The New
Brunswick Court of Appeal apportioned the damages, allowing 75 percent
recovery. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, reversed the Court of
Appeal's decision on the ground that the last clear chance doctrine had
been insufficiently considered. In the Supreme Court's view, the defendant
was ultimately negligent. There was "no evidence" on which the jury
"could find that fault of the infant plaintiff was in the legal sense a cause
of his injury."7 It thus followed that the New Brunswick Contributory
Negligence Act had no application to the case, and the Court awarded the
plaintiff 100 percent of his damages. The Court was perhaps motivated
by a desire to assist the family of an injured boy, but in doing so, the
Court limited the applicability of the contributory negligence statutes in
cases in which one party could be deemed ultimately negligent. There was
some irony in the result, as law professor Malcolm MacIntrye concluded
some years later: the McLaughlin decision "delivered by the same court
which had assisted in inspiring the legislatures to enact the statutes" had,
"ironically enough, deprived them of much of their usefulness."so
Contemporary commentators reached the same conclusion. Dean
Falconbridge argued that the Court had re-imposed the old common law
principle of last clear chance and thus limited the impact of the statutes. He
asked whether it was "not desirable that the search for ultimate negligence
or the last clear chance to avoid the accident should be, as far as possible,
rendered unnecessary?" "Unless some such result is achieved," he

79. McLaughlin Estate v Long, [1927] SCR 303 at 311.
80. MM Maclntyre, "Last Clear Chance after Thirty Years Under the Apportionment Statutes"
(1955) 33 Can Bar Rev 257 at 263.
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concluded, "we do not seem to be much better off than before." 8' "This
result seems unfortunate," concluded John J. Robinette of Osgoode Hall
Law School, since situations that previously fell under the ambit ofultimate
negligence "demand an apportionment of the degrees of fault just as much
as the situations where the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant is
concurrent." This was especially true in automobile accidents, for which
"the attempt to establish against the parties and categorize negligence,
contributory negligence and ultimate negligence seems artificial and
destructive of the real purpose of the investigation as to who caused the
accident." 2
In a 1935 address to the Canadian BarAssociation, Vincent MacDonald
of Dalhousie Law School also critiqued the judicial application of the
contributory negligence legislation, and he proposed a solution as well.
MacDonald was a key member of a small group of Canadian legal realist
scholars, including Bora Laskin, Cecil Wright, and W.P.M. Kennedy, who
in the 1930s sought to make the law meet the needs of modem society.
Heavily influenced by American legal scholarship, these academics are
best known for their work on Canadian constitutional and administrative
law. 83 However, many also wrote and spoke extensively about the need

81. John D Falconbridge, "Desirable Changes in the Common Law" (1927) 5 Can Bar Rev 581 at
583. Falconbridge appealed directly to the Ontario attorney general for amendments to the Ontario
Negligence Act: John D Falconbridge to attorney general of Ontario (21 January 1927), AO, RG432, file 720: AGO Legislation 1927-Contributory Negligence Act. See also Robert I Towers,
"Contributory and Ultimate Negligence," Proceedings of the Canadian Bar Association, 1926 at 5;
AC Heighington, "Negligence-Contributory and Ultimate-Contributory Negligence Act" (193) 8
Can Bar Rev 466.
82. John J Robinette, "Delictual Responsibility in the Common Law Provinces of Canada" (1933)
11Can Bar Rev 88 at 91. Irving S Fairty advocated legislation granting courts "a larger latitude than at
present in determining whether, where both parties have been negligent, natural equity demands that
responsibility for the damages should be shared by the litigants." Leaving cases to the courts to dispose
of "on a common sense basis" could not "possibly work more injustice than does the present system,
and it at least would eliminate the semi-farcical spectacle of the bench and bar attempting to guide
a jury through the mazes of the law of ultimate negligence": IS Fairty, "Negligence-Contributory
Negligence Act-Appointment of Damages"(1931) 9 Can Bar Rev 52 at 54, 55 [Fairty, "Negligence"].
Fairty contacted the Ontario government directly to appeal for a legislative amendment, see Irving S
Fairty to attorney general of Ontario (5 May 1926), AO, RG4-32, file 1961: Attorney General Registry
Criminal and Civil Files. Also see JA Weir, "Davies v Mann and Contributory Negligence Statutes"
(1931) 9 Can Bar Rev 470. In his book devoted entirely to the judicial interpretation of the contributory
negligence acts, British Columbia lawyer Cyril Francis Davie concluded in 1936 that the legislation
had "not brought about that simplification of the law of contributory negligence which had been
anticipated, and that we find unmistakable evidence of great confusion in uniformly administering the
altered law": Cyril Francis Davie, Common Law andStatutory Amendment in Relation to Contributory
Negligence in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1936) at 1.
83. Richard Risk, "Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s: 'When the World was Turned Upside
Down' (2004) 27 Dal LJ 1; RCB Risk, "The Many Minds of WPM Kennedy" (1998) 48 UTLJ 353;
R Blake Brown, "The Canadian Legal Realists and Administrative Law Scholarship, 1930-1941"
(2000) 9 Dal J Leg Stud 36.
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to improve Canadian private law. In considering negligence, MacDonald
told the association that the "basic concepts of the law" had "originated
at times when the social and economic conditions which gave them birth
were vastly different." In his view, the law must "adapt for the common
good." The judicial interpretation of provincial contributory negligence
legislation troubled MacDonald. He believed that the acts had worked
within the restricted areas to which they had been confined-by allowing
the plaintiff some recovery, the acts "have justified themselves." He noted
the existence of calls to abolish contributory negligence but urged caution.
In his view, courts should retain the common law rule barring recovery
in cases of ultimate negligence. He defended the last clear chance rule
on the ground of policy. In his view, the doctrine of ultimate negligence
was "intrinsically just and convenient in its results, for it merely means
that he who caused the injury should pay for or bear it." However, he
hoped that the courts would adopt a less technical approach, and, in doing
so, apply the acts to more cases. He damned courts for detailing events
in such detail that "in practice many cases in which the negligent acts
were substantially contemporaneous were treated as if they were cases of
ultimate negligence."84 MacDonald thus encouraged courts to extend the
benefits of contributory negligence acts to more litigants by abandoning
efforts to find evidence of ultimate negligence in all cases. Doing so would
avoid tossing out common law principles and allow for a more accurate
application of statute law.
Other Canadian scholars disagreed with MacDonald's solutions. In
1938, tort law expert Cecil Wright argued that the doctrine of ultimate
negligence and last clear chance should be abolished: "Ultimate
negligence served its purpose of allowing a rough comparison of blame
at a time when the common law denied the existence of apportionment.
We profoundly wish that, like other wholesome but obsolete fictions, it
may rest in peace,-but we feel quite sure that it will do no such thing.""
The comment was typical Wright, who revelled in bombast but provided

84. Vincent C MacDonald, "The Negligence Action and the Legislature" (1935) 13 Can Bar Rev 535
at 535, 536, 559, 561 (emphases in original). Also see Vincent C MacDonald, "Review of Cyril Francis
Davie, Common Law and Statutory Amendment in Relation to ContributoryNegligence in Canada"
(1936) 14 Can Bar Rev 368; Vincent C MacDonald, "Review of Charles 0 Gregory,Legislative Loss
Distributionin NegligenceActions. A Study in AdministrativeAspects of ComparativeNegligence and
Contribution in Tort Litigation" (1936) 14 Can Bar Rev 780.
85. CAW, "Negligence-Causation-Ultimate Negligence" (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 137 at 143.
Wright consistently critiqued the judicial use of last clear chance. See CAW, "Negligence-Children's
Contributory Negligence-Foreseeability by Dependant-Duty of Care or Apportionment" (1945) 23
Can Bar Rev 162.
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few solutions to thorny legal issues.' 6 Nevertheless, the idea of getting
rid of contributory negligence continued to have proponents. Malcolm
MacIntyre of the University of Alberta complained in 1940 that "decisions
superimposing last clear chance upon these statutes" added "injustice as
well as complexity to an already confused corpusjuris;" "[e]very vestige
of last clear chance must be swept away in favour of apportionment.""
V. Statutory amendments
In the efforts to reform the law further, the more conservative approach of
Vincent Macdonald proved more persuasive. The judicial interpretation
of the original contributory negligence legislation led the Canadian Bar
Association and the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation to call for amendments to the model statute. In 1928, the
Committee on Contributory Negligence of the Conference considered
whether its model act should be amended to make the principle applicable
to more situations. The committee consisted of the same representatives
that had drafted the first model bill: King, Aikins, Falconbridge, and
Elliott, as well as Arthur W. Rogers, a young lawyer who worked as a
solicitor in the office of the attorney general of Ontario." The key question
became whether "the legislation could or should take a form which would
effectively render unnecessary the search for ultimate negligence." The
committee, however, concluded with regret that new legislation would
prove ineffective. It was "not reasonably possible to define in terms of
general application the point at which negligence prior to the accident
passes from the category of extraneous and irrelevant events into the list
of things which may fairly be considered to have contributed to the result
so as to entail a share of liability." The committee felt that the "retention of
these safeguards against liability would seem to be in accord with abstract
justice as well as with the whole trend of the law of negligence."89 The
Committee members thus failed to craft a solution.
The commissioners soon considered the contributory negligence act
again. In 1929, the attorney general of Ontario introduced the 1924 model
act in the provincial legislature to replace the Ontario legislation. Members
of the Ontario Bar, however, suggested amendments. Since only three
86. R Blake Brown, "Cecil A Wright and the Foundations of Canadian Tort Law Scholarship" (2001)
64 Sask L Rev 169.
87. Malcolm M MacIntyre, "The Rationale of Last Clear Chance" (1940) 18 Can Bar Rev 665 at
689, 690.
88. Greene, supra note 32 at 1678.
89. Francis King, "Report of the Committee on the Contributory Negligence Act," Proceedingsof
the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada,
1928 at 90, 92. Also see Fairty, "Negligence," supranote 82 at 54.
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provinces had adopted the model act, the commissioners decided to revisit
the topic in light of the various proposed Ontario amendments. Ontario,
however, acted before the commissioners completed their work, passing
a new Negligence Act in 1930. The revised act allowed for a person not
already a party to an action who might have been responsible to be added
as a defendant. It also dictated that, where two or more persons were liable
to another person suffering loss or damage, they would be jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff."
Debate on more substantial changes to the contributory negligence
rule continued. In 1931, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
of Legislation asked the Committee of the Canadian Bar Association on
Comparative Legislation and Law Reform to consider the contributory
negligence issue." In a 1932 report, the Canadian Bar Association
committee proposed legislative language to discourage courts from
employing the ultimate negligence doctrine to bar the use of the statutes. It
offered for discussion a proposal that, when a party was found at fault, s/he
"shall contribute to the payment of the damages, even if some other party
or parties was or were guilty of ultimate negligence or had the last clear
chance to avoid the act causing the loss or damage."92 After discussion and
consultation, the committee expressed the opinion that there should be
protection against a finding of sole liability based on ultimate negligence.
The committee nevertheless believed that ultimate negligence and the
contributory negligence legislation could co-exist. In 1933, the committee
produced a model statute apportioning damages in actions arising out of
motor vehicle accidents; it provided that "the finding that one or more of
the parties in an action might, by the exercise of care, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of another party, or of other parties, shall...
be material only in fixing the respective contributions of the persons found
negligent.""
90. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
of Legislation in Canada, 1929 at 21; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Unformity ofLegislation in Canada, 1930 at 17-18; The Negligence Act, 1930, SO
1930, c 27; "Changes in Canadian Statute Law" (1930) 8 Can Bar Rev 652 at 657-658. Also see The
Negligence Act, 1931, SO 1931, c 26. The attorney general of Ontario later invited Riddell J to draft a
bill that would abrogate the last clear chance doctrine, although the government never introduced the
bill into the provincial assembly: Falsettov Brown, [1933] OR 645; Maclntyre, supra note 80 at 274.
91. "Topics of the Month" (1931) 9 Can Bar Rev 366 at 366-367.
92. "Report of the Committee on Comparative Provincial Legislation and Law Reform," Minutes of
Proceedingsof the Annual Meeting of the CanadianBarAssociation, 1932 (Toronto: Carswell, 1933)
at 155.
93. "The Contributory Negligence Act," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissionerson Uniformity ofLegislation in Canada,1933 at 32. Also see "Comparative Provincial
Legislation and Law Reform" (1933) 11 Can Bar Rev 549 at 551.
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The work of the Canadian Bar Association committee prompted the
Conference to consider the issue again. The Conference tasked the Nova
Scotia commissioners with evaluatingthe barassociation's 1933 proposals.94
Nova Scotia had two representatives: Frederick Mathers, the province's
deputy attorney general, and, most importantly, Vincent MacDonald. The
report reflected many of MacDonald's views. In discussing the Canadian
Bar Association committee's draft report, MacDonald noted that the
judicial limitation of the acts only to situations of "concurrentnegligence"
represented "a serious curtailment in their scope." MacDonald, however,
continued to hope that altering the legislation slightly would lead to a
broader application of the contribution system. Unlike the bar association
committee, which suggested making ultimate negligence only relevant
in fixing the respective contributions of the persons found negligent,
MacDonald opposed abolishing the doctrine of ultimate negligence.
Instead, he cited the House of Lords' decision in the 1922 Volute case
for the principle that "contributory negligence must be dealt with broadly
and upon common-sense principles." He criticized Canadian courts for
lacking common sense when they spent excessive energy finding evidence
of ultimate negligence. The solution was to write the Volute approach into
the statute such that "many cases of so-called ultimate negligence will
hereafter be deemed substantially contemporaneous, and thereby the scope
of the Act enlarged so as to afford relief to many more plaintiffs." 95 The
Nova Scotia commissioners thus proposed two versions of an amendment,
each of which would largely accomplish the same goal. The provisions
dictated that judges should not submit questions of ultimate negligence to
juries unless the judge believed the jury could reasonably find that the act
or omission was perceptibly subsequent to the other act or omission. The
Conference decided that if the representatives of at least two provinces
objected to the draft bill then the commissioners would not recommend
the adoption of this proposal. British Columbia and Ontario objected. The
commissioners compromised in 1935 by resolving that one section of the
model statute (s 5) be printed with an explanatory note indicating that the
Conference believed the section enunciated the law in Volute. Provinces

94. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
of Legislation in Canada, 1932 at 19; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Unformity of Legislationin Canada, 1934 at 17.
95. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation in Canada, 1934 at 53, 54, 57, 59 (emphases in original); Admiralty Commissionersv SS
Volute, [1922] 1 AC 129.
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could consider the advisability of including that section in their act.9 6 The
Conference thus hoped to encourage courts to expand the purview of the
contributory negligence acts.
Several more provinces subsequently adopted contributory negligence
legislation. After some debate, Alberta passed a copy of the revised model
act in 1937, as did Prince Edward Island in 1938 and Manitoba in 1939.17
Saskatchewan eventually followed suit as well; the provincial legislature
delayed passing an act after members of the legal profession asked the
government to wait and see how successfully the legislation worked in
other provinces. In 1943, the province's bar association passed a resolution
calling for an act, and Saskatchewan adopted a contributory negligence
statute based on the Ontario legislation the following year.98
Some Canadian courts began to extend the reach of the contributory
negligence statutes. For example, in 1941 the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Gives v CNR decided against putting the question of ultimate negligence to
juries. In this case, a train in London struck a car, killing a man and his son.
They were passengers in a vehicle owned and driven by the man's brother,
96. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
of Legislation in Canada, 1934 at 19; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1935 at 14-15. The final proposed section
provided that:
The Judge shall not submit to the jury any question as to whether notwithstanding the fault
of one party, the other could have avoided the consequences thereof unless in his opinion
there is evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find that the act or omission of the
latter was clearly subsequent to and severable from the act or omission of the former so as
not to be substantially contemporaneous with it (ibid at 31).
97. The ContributoryNegligence Act, SA 1937, c 18; The ContributoryNegligence Act, SPEl 1938,
c 5; The Tortfeasorsand ContributoryNegligence Act, SM 1939, c 75; Sydney Wood, "Tendencies in
Tort" (1934-1936) 1 Alta LQ 133 at 133-134; R Andrew Smith, "The Change in the Common Law
Effected by the Contributory Negligence Act ofAlberta" (1938-1939) 3 Alta LQ 189; MM MacIntyre,
"Report to the Canadian Bar Association of the Committee on Noteworthy Changes in Statute Law,
Presented September 1, 1944" (1943-1945) 57 Alta LQ 210.
98. "Synopsis of Proceedings" (1936) 1 Sask Bar Rev & L Soc Gaz 66 at 68-69; "Annual
Convention-Resolutions" (1943) 8 Sask Bar Rev & L Soc Gaz69 at 72; The ContributoryNegligence
Act, 1944, SS 1944, c 23. Newfoundland had a contributory negligence statute after joining Canada
in 1949: The Contributory Negligence Act, 1951, SN 1951, c 48. Other provinces amended their
contributory negligence laws. British Columbia, for example, more clearly laid out how damages
should be awarded. Whereas the 1925 British Columbia act simply provided that a jury would
determine degrees of fault, the new act created a step by step process, entailing (1) the determination
of damage sustained by each party in dollar terms, and (2) the degree to which each person was at
fault expressed in percentage terms: ContributoryNegligenceAct, SBC 1936, c 12, s 3. Ontario would
again act on its own in 1935, dictating that passengers injured in motor vehicle accidents could not get
damages from the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, although the portion of the loss caused by the
owner or driver should be determined so that the other driver would only be required to compensate
the injured passenger for their portion of the damages. Ontario also prevented spouses of negligent
persons from recovering the portion of the damages caused by the negligence of their spouse: The
Negligence Amendment Act, 1935, SO 1935, c 46; "The Passenger Hazard," Toronto Daily Star (3
April 1935) 7.
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who was uninjured. The jury found the train company twenty percent at
fault and the car's owner eighty percent responsible. The trial judge asked
the jury if either party could have avoided the accident, thus raising the
issue of ultimate negligence. Chief Justice Robert Robertson upheld the
verdict but held that "no purpose can be served" by "submitting any further
question as to 'ultimate' negligence." Justice Cornelius Arthur Masten
also dismissed the appeal and asserted that he was "unable to appreciate
that the doctrine of ultimate negligence has survived the provisions of
The Negligence Act."99 The decision pleased Cecil Wright. "After a long
struggle," he wrote, "Ontario has, for all practical purposes, decided that
an issue of ultimate negligence is not required to be put before a jury who
find that the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant contributed to the
damage and assess degrees of fault."' 00
While Wright deemed this jurisprudential trend as positive, other
scholars lacked his certainty and began to question the effect of the
apportionment legislation. Some wondered whether the legislation had
in fact benefitted defendants as much, or more, than plaintiffs. As noted
earlier, some critics of the contributory negligence doctrine had suggested
that it prevented plaintiffs from receiving compensation. However, the
new laws could also limit the potential liability of defendants, especially
big businesses. The 1930 Morgan v The British Columbia Electric
Railway Co. case exemplified this tendency. In Morgan, the plaintiff, in
breach of a municipal by-law, parked his truck on a street railway line on
a dark night to make it easier to unload his vehicle. A streetcar operator,
not keeping an adequate lookout, subsequently struck the truck. The trial
court concluded that the motorman could have avoided the accident if
he had kept a good lookout. The trial judge found both parties negligent
and awarded the plaintiff four-fifths of his damages using the British
Columbia Contributory Negligence Act.'' The last clear chance doctrine
traditionally would have allowed the courts to obviate the contributory
negligence rule and find the street railway wholly responsible. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed the relative responsibility for the
damages (making the plaintiff eighty per cent and the defendant twenty
percent respectively responsible), and Justice Archer Martin expressed
his wish that the truck owner be wholly responsible for the accident. He
99. Gives v Canadian National Railway, [1941] 4 DLR 625.
100. Cecil A Wright, "The Law of Torts: 1923-1947" (1948) 26 Can Bar Rev 46 at 71. But on the
other hand, see Towne v British Columbia Electric Railway, [19431 3 DLR 572, where the British
Columbia Court of Appeal used the older approach. See "Negligence-Ultimate Negligence and
Apportionment Statutes" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 663.
101. BC Contributory Negligence Act, supra note 75.
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couched this preference in policy terms: "The street railway company
must keep to its schedule or the people will not be able to keep their
appointments or get to their work."o 2 The result befuddled an author in
the Alberta Law Quarterly, who noted that the contributory negligence
acts had helped the company at the expense of the plaintiff, even though
it "would appear that the plaintiff ought to have recovered all the damages
he suffered, however reprehensible and inconsiderate we may consider
his conduct to have been." 03 The Canadian Bar Review later noted that
courts had begun to apportion losses in instances of strict liability and
intentional wrongdoing, such that "apportionment legislation will be of
benefit not only to a negligent plaintiff but also to a defendant."' 04 By
1954, Cecil Wright, in the first edition of his Cases on the Law of Torts,
commented that apportionment statutes, by spreading out responsibility
for motor vehicle accidents, may have reduced the total sum of liabilities
payable by insurance companies.' If these commentators were correct,
the advocates of reforming contributory negligence to assist business had
achieved their desired goal.
Conclusion
The contributory negligence doctrine made no one happy in the early
twentieth century. Practising lawyers and judges found it uncertain and
complicated. Many legal academics damned it as outdated and out of step
with modem society. Business felt it failed to protect them from lawsuits
by careless plaintiffs. The injured, on the other hand, felt threatened
that the law would completely bar recovery for their losses. Advocates
of change found no easy solutions. The large body of existing case law,
despite its complications, encouraged some lawyers and judges to fall
back on older jurisprudence when interpreting the new acts. Legislators

102. Morgan v The British Columbia ElectricRailway, [1930] 4 DLR 300. Christopher Moore notes
that Martin JA had a tendency to consider the efficient functioning of vital industries: Christopher
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UBC Press for the Osgoode Society, 2010) at 35. For other examples see "Claim Damages Excessive,"
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and law reformers responded by increasing the length and complexity of
the negligence acts, thus undermining the goal of simplifying the law. 06
Thirty years after Ontario passed the first piece of contributory
negligence legislation, law professor Malcolm MacIntyre argued that the
acts had failed to achieve their aim. "Unfortunately," he concluded, the
legislation "was done quickly," and "nobody had made any clear analysis
of the whole problem; and nobody wondered whether or not the lastchance doctrine should.be abolished." As a result, the "courts have spent
the intervening years making an unbelievably confused and contradictory
mess out of the words of the statute." 07 By the mid-1950s, Cecil Wright
also abandoned his earlier optimism. He critiqued "the tenacity with
which older concepts have survived modem legislation, and the seeming
inability of courts to bring order out of chaos." In thinking about what to do
next, Wright noted that the changing social context might require a more
innovative system. In 1914, accidents involving railways and streetcars
remained front and centre in tort law and scholarship. By the Second
World War, however, the automobile accident became the "typical" topic
of analysis. This shift had consequences. While railway cases often saw
average men and women in conflict with large corporations, automobile
accidents usually involved people of more modest means meeting in
court. The issues of economic development and the inequality between
parties disappeared. Instead, the question became how to fairly and
quickly provide compensation for the many people injured in automobile
accidents each year. Wright thus pondered "whether the time has not
come for replacing our whole elaborate structure of compensation for
victims of automobile accidents by an insurance scheme apart from fault,
contributory or otherwise."1os
While legal scholars downplayed the concrete effect ofthe contributory
negligence legislation, the debate over legislative change is historically
significant for three reasons. First, law reform advocates proved remarkably
weak at analyzing the potential impacts of their proposals. While members
of the legal profession sensed inequitable results, they lacked the social
science tools to analyze the actual problem or to gauge how their proposed
solutions would affect cases on the ground. Law reform advocates, for
106. Despite legislation removing contributory negligence as a bar to recovery, contributory negligence
remained operative in some specific situations. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the
last vestiges of contributory negligence should be removed from maritime law. Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin noted that tort law "no longer accepts the traditional theory underpinning the contributory
negligence bar," and that the "contributory negligence bar results in manifest unfairness": Bow Valley
Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, [199713 SCR 1210 at para 94.
107. MacIntyre, supranote 80 at 260.
108. Wright, supra note 105 at 428, 429.
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example, seemed surprised that the courts would continue to find ultimate
negligence. Canadian lawyers in the first half of the twentieth century were
only capable of considering doctrine, yet they somehow felt confident in
their ability to propose law amendments that would positively affect many
Canadians.
Second, the willingness of several leading Canadian common law
lawyers and judges to draw inspiration for legislative change from the
faute commune doctrine of Quebec civil law is surprising. The interwar
period was generally a time of heightened "solitudes" in Canada, such
that lawyers and judges in English and French Canada saw little value
in sampling the ideas of each other's legal traditions.109 However, the
efforts of several prominent judges and lawyers to use French civil law to
buttress their case against the continued use of an unreformed contributory
negligence doctrine evidences the need for a mild correction to the
traditional account.
Third, the work of the early Canadian Bar Association and the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada
demonstrates the very close connections between the business community
and the legal elite of Canada in the early twentieth century. Corporate
lawyers sought to protect and promote the interests of their clients. For
business, lawyers' attempts at securing uniformity had obvious benefits. To
most Canadians, lawyers appeared as impartial advocates ofuseful statutory
reform. Corporate interests could thus seek change without creating the
appearance of lobbying. Too often, Canadian business historians have
ignored the role of law in furthering enterprise. The attempts to secure
uniformity, including standardized changes to the contributory negligence
doctrine, however, highlight the role of business in shaping Canadian law
for its own benefit.
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